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SAM L. KINIRY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,;
vs.

Case No. 16665

LARRY SORENSON and AMERICAN
HERITAGE BUILDERS, INC.
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

I

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action sought foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage, a determination of the amount due on a
promissory note, and a judgment against the corporate
defendant, American Heritage Builders, Inc., and the
individual defendant, the Appellant Larry Sorenson, in
his individual capacity, in the amount so determined,
together with interest, costs and a reasonable attorney
fee.
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II

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court below granted Plaintiff-Respondent
a foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, a judgment j oir.tly
and severally against the corporate defendant and
against the individual defendant in his personal capaci:y
for the deficiency in the amount of ELEVEN THOt:SAND

SEVE~i

HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT DOLLARS and 64/100 ($11,648.64),
and a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of THREE
THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($3,000.00), together

wit~

costs and the statutory rate of interest from the date
of judgment.
III

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirwance of the
lower court's decision.
IV
STATEMEHT OF FACTS
In December of 1973, the Plaintiff and his
former spouse purchased a house from the Defendants.
(t.r. pg. 16, L. 22-24)

At the time the terms of said

purchase were negotiated, the Plaintiff and his wife
were living in a trailer home which they owned subject
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to a lien in favor of Cyprus Credit Union. (t.r. pg. 54,
L. 13-22)

They desired to trade their interest in the

trailer home as a down payment toward the house, and
the parties agreed to an arrangement whereby the Defendants
would sell Plaintiff and his wife the house, and Plaintiff
and his wife would convey to Defendants their interest
in the trailer home. (t.r. pg. 12, L. 3-13)

Plaintiff's

trailer home was then subject to a mortgage at what the
parties considered to be a favorable rate of interest.
Rather than pay off the mortgage, they agreed that
Plaintiff would continue to make payments on the mortgage
to Cyprus Credit Union in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTYNINE DOLLARS and N0/100 ($189.00) per month, and that
Defendants would re-imburse Plaintiff monthly for that
amount. (t.r. pg. 12, L. 29, 30 and pg. 13, L. 1-19)
The Defendants executed a promissory note to Plaintiff
and his wife in the amount of the outstanding indebtedness
on the trailer home, THIRTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100,
($13,000.00), payable in the amount of ONE HillU>RED EIGHTYNINE DOLLARS and N0/100 ($189.00) per month.
14, L. 5-30, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1)

(t.r., pg.

To secure payment

of the note in question, the corporate Defendant, American
Heritage Builders, Inc., granted Plaintiff and his wife
a chattel mortgage in the trailer home.

(Defendant's

Exhibit 6)
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Subsequent to the above-described transactions,
the Plaintiff and his wife were divorced.

In an Order

entered by the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake
County on August 31, 1976, the Plaintiff was awarded all
right, title and interest in the promissory note and
chattel mortgage in question.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2)

By September of 1975, the Defendants had
defaulted on the promissory note in issue. (t.r. pg. 38,
L. 14-18)

The corporate defendant, though neither dissolved

nor discharged in bankruptcy, had become financially
defunct. (t.r. pg. 6, L. 17-30, pg. 7, L. 1-30, pg.
8, L. 1-2)

The Plaintiff demanded repeatedly that the

Defendants pay the amount owed on the note, and they
refused to do so.
pg. 41, L. 1-10)

(t.r. pg. 40, L. 11-18, L. 27-30,
Finally, on or about September 14,

1976, the Plaintiff declared the full amount of the note
to be due and owing, as per the terms of the note, and
brought the present action to obtain judgment on the note
and foreclose the chattel mortgage. (r., pg. 2)

The

corporate defendant, American Heritage Builders, Inc.,
defaulted in that action, and a Judgment by Default was
entered against it.
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The Court below granted foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage.

A sheriff's sale of the trailer

home was held on or about January 28, 1977, subsequent
to the default of the corporate defendant, the mortgagor
of the chattel mortgage. (r., pg. 107, Finding of Fact
#9)

At said sale, the Plaintiff bid ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS

and N0/100 ($1,000.00) of his judgment against the
corporate defendant, and purchased the trailer home.
The Defendants have been granted a credit against their
indebtedness for this ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100
($1,000.00).

(r., pg. 107, Finding of Fact #9, and

Conclusion of Law #3)
The Plaintiff proceeded to trial against the
individual Defendant in the lower court.

After a trial

held July 17, 1979, the court below awarded Plaintiff
a judgment jointly and severally against the Defendant
corporation and against the individual Defendant in his
personal capacity in the amount

of the unpaid indebtedness

on the promissory note, less the above described credit
of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($1,000.00) or ELEVEN
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT DOLLARS and 64/100
($11,748.64), together with a reasonable attorney fee of
THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($3,000.00) plus costs
and interest from the date of judgment.
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individual Defendant, Larry Sorenson.

Parol evidence

in the form of testimony adduced at trial demonstrates
that at the time the promissory note in question '.vas
executed, neither party discussed with the other in
what capacity the Defendant Sorenson was signing the note.
(t.r. qg. 29, L. 29-30, pg. 30, L. 1-3 and t.r. pg.
34, L. 3-6, 27-30, pg. 35 L. 1-3)

Other documents

signed by the parties on the same day as the promissory
note in question, a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
(Defendant's Exhibit 3), a Bill of Sale (Defendant's
Exhibit 5), and a Chattel Mortgage (Defendant's Exhibit
6), bear varying signatures in that the Defendant

Sorenson's signatures on the Bill of Sale and Chattel
Mortgage are unqualified while his signature on the
Uniform Real Estate Contract is qualified as "Larry
Sorenson, Pres." (emphasis added)

The Appellant

testified at trial that some payments made on the note
in issue were made from his personal funds. (t.r. pg.
21, L. 12-19, pg. 23, L. 9-19)
From all this evidence, the lower Court could
and did conclude that the promissory note at issue was
signed by the Defendant-Appellant in his personal capacity
and that he is, therefore, personally liable on the note.
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This finding is supported by the evidence.

It is not

a finding which is clearly against the weight of the
evidence.

It is not a finding where the law has been

misapplied to established facts.

For this reason the

Court must affirm the judgment below.
Point II
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDAHTAPPELLANT SIGNED THE PROMISSORY
NOTE IN QUESTION IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, AND HE IS PERSONALLY
LIABLE THEREON.

A.
THE NOTE IN QUESTION ITSELF MANDATES THAT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BE HELD LIABLE.
The promissory note in question (hereinafter,
the note) appears in the record as Plaintiff's Exhibit
1.

It bears two signature spaces.

On one space appear

the typewritten words "American Heritage Builders, Inc."

On the other space directly below appears the signature
of the Defendant-Appellant, Larry Sorenson.
signature is qualified in any way.

Neither

The issue before the

Court is whether the Appellant signed the note in his
personal capacity, and is therefore personally liable on
the note, or whether he signed it merely as an agent or
officer of the Defendant signatory corporation, and is
therefore not personally liable on the note.
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The applicable Utah statute in this case is
U.C.A.,

~OA-3-403

(1953), which reads as follows:

Signature by authorized representative.-(1) A signature may be made by an
agent or other representative, and his
authority to make it may be established
a~ in other cases of representation.
No particular form of appointment is
necessary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who
signs his own name to an instrument
(a)

is personally obligated if the
instrument neither names the
person represented nor shows
that the representative signed
in a representative capacity;

(b)

except as otherwise established
between the immediate parties,
is personally obligated if the
instrument names the person
represented but does not show
that the representative signed in
a representative capacity, or if
the instrument does not name
the person represented but does
show that the representative
signed in a representative capacity.

(3) Except as otherwise established the
name of an organization preceded or followed
by the name and off ice of an authorized
individual is a signature made in a
representative capacity.
This statute requires that the Appellant be
personally bound on the note.

Subsection (2)(a) mandates

that an authorized representative be personally liable
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on an instrument unless the instrument itself clearly
indicates he has signed in a representative capacity.
In the instant case, the Appellant did not qualify his
signature in any way.

The note does not show that ths

Appellant signed in his capacity as representative of
the defendant corporation.

Appellant is, therefore,

personally liable on the note.
Subsection (2)(b) further requires that a
person be obligated on an instrument unless he shows on
the instrument that he signed in a representative capacity,
or unless the parties otherwise agree.
must be found personally obligated.

Again the Appellant

The note does not

show that he signed in a representative capacity, and
the evidence adduced at trial does not show that the
parties agreed otherwise.

The parties simply did not

discuss the issue of Appellant's obligation at all.
(t.r. pg. 29, L. 29-30, pg. 30, L. 1-3 and t.r. pg. 34,
L. 3-6, 27-30, pg. 35, L. 1-3)
Subsection (3) provides an easy out for officers
of a corporation who wish not to be bound personally
on an instrument.

They may sign the instrument with the

name of the corporation followed by their name and office.
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In the present case, the Appellant chose not to sign the
note with his name and office.
sign with his name.

He chose merely to

From this the Court should infer

that the Appellant intended to be personally obligated
on the note.
The Court should construe U.C.A., 70A-3-403,
(1953) strictly against the Defendant-Appellant.

The

statute provides means by which a representative may sign
an instrument without becoming personally obli8ated,
and provides that a signer who does not show he is
signing in a representative capacity will be personally
abligated on the instrument.

The Appellant should not

now be heard to argue that when he signed the note, however
he may have signed it, he did not mean to be bound.

His

own self-serving testimony of his intent is not sufficient
to overcome the dictates of the statute.

He has failed

to heed the provisions of the statute, and it should be
strictly construed against him.
Courts in numerous jurisdictions have so
construed this provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.
They have held that where an instrument is endorsed as is
the note in question, where the name of a corporation is
followed by the unqualified signature of the corporation's
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authorized representative, both the corporation and
the representative personally are liable on the instrument.
Lumberman Associates, Inc. v. Palmer, 344 F. Supp. 1129
(E.D. Penn., 1972), affd. 485 F.2d 680; Fanning v. Hembree
Oil Co., 434S.W.2d 822 (Ark., 1968); Norfolk County Trust
Co. v. Vichensky, 359N.E. 2d 59 (Mass. App., 1977);
Lanier v. Bank of Virginia, 387 A.2d 614 (Md. App., 1977);
Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 385 N.E. 2d 1068 (N.Y. App.,
1978); Kroh v. Pronto Petroleum Co., 536 P. 2d 860 (Colo.
App., 1975); Perez v. Janota, 246 N.E. 2d 42 (Ill. App.,
1969); Seamon v. Acree, 236 S.E. 2d 688 (Ga. App., 1977).
Such a strict construction of U.C.A., §70A3-403, (1953), would also be in keeping with the underlying
theories of the law of negotiable instruments.

The

purpose of a negotiable instrument is that it may be
freely negotiated in commerce.

The theory is that persons

ought to be able to trade freely in commercial paper,
and that such free negotiability of commercial paper is
essential to our economy.

To enhance the unhampered

exchange of negotiable instruments, a cardinal rule has
developed that all terms of a negotiable instrument
must appear clearly on the document.

In the words of

Learned Hand, a negotiable instrument must be "a courier
without baggage."

Specifically, U.C.A., §70A-3-104, (1953),
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requires that, to be negotiable, a promissory note
such as the note here in question must be signed by the
maker.

It must show who is bound by the note.
In the instant case, the Defendants purported

to make a negotiable instrument payable to the Plaintiff,
and the Defendant-Appellant personally signed the note
without indicating on the note that he would not be
personally bound.

It would be incongruous with the above-

described law of negotiable instruments to hold that
the Defendant-Appellant should not be bound on the note
when he signed it in an unqualified manner.

As noted

above, all terms of a negotiable instrument must appear
on the instrument itself, including the name of the
person to be bound.

Holders of negotiable instruments

should not be made to guess
them on the instrument.
from the document itself.

exactly who is liable to

This information should be derived
Where an unqualified signature

appears on a negotiable instrument, it must be presumed
that the signer is liable on that instrument. U.C.A.,
§70A-3-403, (1953), must be strictly construed in keeping
with this policy.

The statute must be construed so that

where an unqualified signature appears on an instrument,
the signer is personally bound.

The Defendant-Appellant

herein is bound on the note pursuant to a strict construction
of U.C.A., §70A-3-403, (1953).
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Finally, the language contained in the body
of the note supports a finding that both the Appellant
and the Defendant corporation are bound on the note.
The note is worded in the plural.

It begins, "For

value received We (sic), the undersigned after date,
without grace I (or we) promise to pay .

II

The

fact that the note is written in the plural indicates
that at least two seperate persons are liable for payment
of the note.

The only two persons indicated as makers

and signers of the note are the two Defendants.

The

Defendant-Appellant is thus liable on the note, or the
note is gramatically incorrect and makes no sense.
More significantly, the first "we" of the
above-quoted passage is type-written, and was inserted
into the language of the note by the note's maker.
is not a mere formality of a printed form.

It

The Appellant

testified at trial that the note was prepared by his
secretary at his direction and to his specifications.
(t.r. pg. 4, L. 8-23)

The fact that the Appellant himself

prepared the note and worded it in the plural is strong
evidence that the Appellant is bound on the note along
with the Defendant corporation.
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This Court has recognized that the fact that
a negotiable instrument is worded in the plural is
proof that both the corporate maker and the individual
maker of the instrument are bound.

Stanley v. Deseret

Foods Corp., 74 P.2d 1221 (Utah, 1938).

There, the

Court found, at page 1223, that the phrase "we promise
to pay" unambiguously indicates that both the corporation
and the unqualified endorser of a note intended to be
bound thereon.

The wording of the note here in question

clearly indicates that the Appellant is liable on the
note.

B.
PAROL EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL FURTHER MANDATES
THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE ON
THE NOTE.
The Court below permitted parol evidence of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the note to
be presented at trial.

It permitted testimony of all

parties to this action and of third persons present at the
time the note was signed.

This testimony encompassed

all aspects of the negotiations surrounding the note and
the subjective intent of the parties.

This parol evidence

supports the lower court's decision that Appellant is liable
on the note.
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Plaintiff's testimony indicates that at the
time the note was signed he believed the DefendantAppellant would be liable on the note.

His understanding

of the whole transaction was simply that Appellant was
selling his home to Plaintiff and was giving Plaintiff
his note back as part of the deal. (t.r. pg. 34, L. 27-30,
pg. 35, L. 1-3, pg. 36, L. 4-30, ·pg. 45, L. 8-11)

Further,

the Appellant himself testified at trial that at no time
did the parties discuss the personal liability of
Appellant on the note.

They did not explicitly discuss

this matter at all. (t.r. pg. 29, L. 29-30, pg. 30, L. 1-3)
However, Appellant did testify that he told Plaintiff all
along that he was simply selling his home to Plaintiff.
(t.r. pg. 18, L. 23-30, pg. 19, L. 1-3)

In short, the

parol evidence adduced at trial establishes that the
parties did not have an oral understanding that Appellant
would not be liable on the note.
establishes that both

The evidence further

parties regarded the transaction

as Appellant's selling of his home to Plaintiff.

This

understanding of the parties supports the lower court's
judgment against Appellant.
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The Appellant testified at trial that he made
at least one cash payment to Plaintiff on the note, that
he received a receipt on the cash payment and that the
funds for some of the payments to Plaintiff on the note
came from Appellant's personal funds. (t.r. pg. 20, L.
18-30, pg. 21, L. 1-19, pg. 23, L. 9-30, pg. 24, L. 1-4)
All this conduct on Appellant's part is inconsistent
with his claim that he did not intend to be personally
liable on the note.

It is unusual business practice for

a corporation to make cash payments to its creditors.
It is even more unusual for a corporation to accept a
receipt for a cash payment where the receipt is made to
an individual person.

And it is totally inconsistent

with Appellant's claim of no personal liability on the
note that he made payments on the note out of his own
personal funds.

All this conduct of Appellant, the cash

payments, personal receipts, and use of personal funds,
is more consistent with the payment of a personal debt
than with the payment of a corporate debt, and supports
the lower court's finding of personal liability in
Appellant.
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The documentary evidence presented below
indicates that Appellant knew very well how to sign a
document in his capacity as a corporate agent.

The

Uniform Real Estate Contract signed by the parties
(Defendant's Exhibit 3) bears Appellant's signature as
"Larry Sorenson, Pres."

If Appellant had wanted to

sign the note as an agent only, he could have signed as
he did on the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Appellant has argued that the Uniform Real
Estate Contract and the note should be construed
together, inasmuch as they were executed together, and
that the qualified signature on the contract limits
Appellant's liability on the note.

It would be inappro-

priate to construe these documents together, however.
The contract is a document conveying title in land.
The title to the land in question was exlusively in a
corporation at the time of the sale. (t.r. pg. 15, L.
7-24)

Hence, Appellant could not have signed the contract

in his personal capacity.

His personal signature on the

document would simply have had no effect.
the other hand, represents a debt.

The note, on

The corporate debtor

in question was a small, family owned entity. (t.r. pg.
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6, L. 3-16)

Unlike a signature on the contract,

Appellant's personal signature on the note could have
an effect beyond merely binding the corporate defendant.
A personal signature there could have the effect of
obligating Appellant personally on the note.

And it

is likely that an officer of a small, closely held
corporation will sign for corporate debts in both a
personal and in an agency capacity in order to encourage
others to conduct business with the corporation.

Hence,

it is logical to construe the Uniform Real Estate Contract
and the note separately, and to find that the Appellant
signed one in a representative capacity and the other
in both representative and personal capacities.

The

manner in which Appellant signed the Uniform Real
Estate Contract indicates he knew how to sign purely as
an agent.

It is not illogical to construe the contract

and the note separately.

The documentary evidence

admitted at trial support the findings of the Court below.
Finally, testimony adduced in the lower Court
indicates that the Appellant was in a much better bargaining
position than the Plaintiff with regard to land transactions.
The Plaintiff testified to having a high school education,
(t.r. pg. 54, L. 25-27) and to being very ignorant of
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real estate matters. (t.r. pg. 36, L. 9-15)

The Appellant,

on the other hand, is currently employed as a real estate
agent.

(t.r. pg. 3, L. 25-30, pg. 4, L. 1-7)

At the

time of the land transaction in question he was an
officer in several corporations conducting business in
real estate and home contruction.
29)

(t.r. pg. 5, L. 20-

All the documents prepared in the course of the

transaction in question were prepared by Appellant.
(t.r. pg. 4, L. 8-23, pg. 34, L. 11-21)

In view of

the divergent situations of the parties, it would be
inequitable now to construe the documents in question
against Plaintiff.

The Appellant knew very well what

he was doing in the course of the land sale at issue
while Plaintiff never had a clear understanding of the
process.

Appellant drew up the note and its accompanying

documents and created the ambiguity as to whom is liable
on the note.

Equity requires that that ambiguity now

be resolved against him.

c.
THE CASES CITED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE INSTANT CASE AND DO NOT
SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE ON
THE NOTE.
The Appellant has cited the case of First Bank
and Trust Company v. Post, 12 U.C.C. Reporting Service 512,
192 N.E.2d 907 (Ill.1973)in support of his claim that he
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is not liable on the note.
from the instant case.

That case is easily distinquishable

First, the promissory note in

Post was given for purchase of an industrial lathe by
a corporation from another business entity.

There could

be no mistake there that the transaction involved
corporate property purchased for corporate use.

Here,

however, the transaction in question involves the sale
and purchase of a residence.

It would be easy and

logical for Plaintiff here to assume the transaction
was a personal one.

And crucially, in Post all parties

to the note there in issue testified that they did not
intend to bind the corporate officers in their personal
capacity.

Here, the Plaintiff has testified that he

assumed he was dealing personally with the Appellant,
and both parties have testified they did not discuss the
matter of Appellant's personal liability.
The Appellant has also cited Speer v. Friedland,
12 U.C.C. Reporting Service 509, 276
in his behalf.

So.2d

84 (Fla. App., 1973

In that case, the corporate officer's

signature was affixed to the check there in question by
a check signing machine, whereas in the instant case,
Appellant personally signed the note. (t.r. pg. 4, L.
22-23)

Moreover, in Speer the corporate officer testified

that she did not intend to be personally bound on the
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check, and the Plaintiff there produced no evidence to
rebutt this testimony.

Here, there is substantial

evidence to rebutt Appellant's claim that he did not
intend to be bound on the note.

Finally, in Speer

as in Post, the holder of the instrument in question
was clearly dealing with an automobile auctioning concern.
As noted above, in the present case it was not at all
clear whether Plaintiff was dealing with a corporation
or an individual.
The Appellant also cites J.P. Sivertson & Co.
v. Lolmaugh, 24 U.C.C. Reporting Service 1212, 380 N.E.
2d 520 (Ill. App. 1978), for the proposition that parol
evidence was properly admitted below.

The admissability

of parol evidence below has never been raised by Plaintiff.
In fact, the parol evidence lends support to Plaintiff's
claim against Appellant, an noted in Point II B above.
addition, Lolmaugh is distinquishable from the present
case.

There, the Court found a prior course of dealings

between the parties to support the conclusion that the
corporate officer signed the instrument soley in a
representative capacity.

Here, there is no prior course

of dealing between the parties to support Appellant's
theory.
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The cases cited by Appellant are distinquishable
from the instant case and do not support Appellant's
claim that he is not personally liable on the note.
POINT III
THE FACT THAT THE MOBILE HOME IN
QUESTION WAS SOLD AT A SHERIFF'S
SALE DOES NOT RELIEVE THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT' S UNDERLYING OBLIGATION
ON THE NOTE.
The Appellant argues in Point II of his brief
that he is no longer liable on the note because the
chattel mortgage on the mobile home in question, which
secured the note, has been foreclosed.

He claims that

the Plaintiff bid ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($1,000.00)
of his judgment against the corporate defendant at
the sheriff's sale and recovered the mobile home.

He

further claims that the Plaintiff resold the mobile
home for THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($3,000.00)
profit above what was owed to the Cypres Credit Union
on the mobile home, and that therefore the note should
be deemed satisfied and the Appellant should be relieved
of his obligation on the note.

Appellant cites in

support of this claim the case of Dulio v. Senechal,
7 U.C.C. Reporting Service 222, (Mass. App. 1969).
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The Dulio case is not applicable in the
instant situation.

The facts of that case are wholly

different from the facts now before the Court.

In Dulio,

X sold Y a used car and Y gave X his personal check for
$500.00 as payment for the car.
the bank.

The check did not clear

Y returned the used car to

x.

The Court in

Dulio held that X was not entitled to collect on the
check in addition to recovering the car.

There was no

promissory note or security interest involved in Dulio
and the whole transaction took place in a matter of days.
Here, Appellant did not merely give a check
to Plaintiff and take Plaintiff's mobile home in exchange.
There was a complex transaction involved in which
Appellant sold Plaintiff his house on contract, took
Plaintiff's trailer home and gave Plaintiff his promissory
note for $13,000

and a chattel mortgage on the mobile home.

A third party held a mortgage on the mobile home and
Plaintiff was to continue paying that third party for
a period of years while receiving payments on the note
for a period of years from Appellant and paying Appellant
on the Uniform Real Estate Contract for a period of years.
To compare the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage here in
issue with the simple purchase and return of goods in
Dulio is absurd.
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Appellant cites the Restatement of Restitution
in support of his claim.

However, Plaintiff here has

not sued in equity for restitution.

He has sued in law

on a note and for enforcement of a contract.

The

Restatement of Restitution is simply not applicable.
Appellant would have the Court believe that
Plaintiff is estopped from pursuing his remedy on the
note merely because he foreclosed a mortgage securing
the note and obtained a ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR ($1,000.00)
recovery at the foreclosure sale.

Appellant has not

ever contended that ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100
($1,000.00) was an unjust or unreasonable price to bid
at the sheriff's sale of the mobile home.

He has

offered no proof that this amount was unreasonable.
And unless that price itself was unreasonable, it is
the only amount which should be considered in determining
how much credit Appellant is entitled to toward the
judgment against him.

The Court should not look at

events which occurred after the sheriff's sale to see
if Plaintiff later managed to make a good bargain on the
mobile home.

In the absence of pleading and proof that

the price bid was unreasonable, the Court should treat
this case as though astrangerhad bought the mobile home
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for $1,000.00 at the sheriff's sale.

The Plaintiff would

be entitled to the $1,000.00 bid, the Appellant would
be entitled to a credit for that amount, and what the
stranger did with the mobile home later would have no
effect on the present case.

What Plaintiff did here with

the mobile home after the sheriff's sale has no effect
on the present case involving liability on the note.
Appellant further seems to argue that after
Plaintiff bought the mobile home at the sheriff's sale,
he was put in as good a condition as he would have been
had Appellant paid on the note, and that this should
bar Plaintiff from further recovery.

However, Plaintiff

is not now in as good a position as he would have been
had Appellant honored his obligation on the note.

Testimony

presented at trial by both parties indicates Appellant
defaulted on the note as early as September of 1975, (t.r.
pg. 38, L. 14-18) and certainly by June of 1976. (t.r.
pg. 23, L. 1-11)

Yet Plaintiff did not buy the trailer

home at the auction sale until January of 1977.

As noted

in the Statement of Facts above, each month the Appellant
failed to pay the Plaintiff on the note, the Plaintiff
nevertheless had to pay his credit union $189.00 as
payment on the mobile home.

From September, 1975 until
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January, 1977 the Plaintiff paid his creditor for a mobile
home he no longer owned and built equity in that mobile
home for Appellant.

It is true the Plaintiff recovered

the mobile home at auction sale in January, 1977, and it
is true he later sold the home for enough to pay off
Cyprus Credit Union's mortgage on the trailer home.
However, the amount he had to pay to clear the mortgage
to Cyprus Credit Union had already been greatly reduced
by payments he had made (payments the Appellant should
have made) from September, 1975 to January, 1977.

If

Appellant had performed on his note as he should have,
Plaintiff would never have had to make those out-ofpocket payments.

Moreover, Plaintiff is entitled to

interest for the payments on which Appellant defaulted.
And the Plaintiff has suffered much expense and
aggrivation in being forced to take Appellant to court
to recover on the note and the chattel mortgage in question.
Clearly, the sheriff's sale of the trailer home has not
put Plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been
in had Appellant performed on the note.
The mere fact that Plaintiff was able to recover
his interest in the mobile home for ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and
N0/100 ($1,000.00) after a suit and foreclosure does not
relieve Appellant of his liability on the note.
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mortgage provides that Plaintiff may recover a deficiency
judgment on the note for any amount not recovered at the
sale of the collateral, and the lower Court's judgment
should stand.

v
CONCLUSION
The Court should not reverse the decision of
the lower Court unless that decision is clearly against
the weight of the evidence.

Appellant has neither

pleaded nor proved that the decision below was against
the weight of the evidence, and the evidence below
supports the lower Court's findings.

The judgment

below must be affirmed.
A review of the evidence adduced at trial
demonstrates that Appellant is personally liable on
the note.

First, an analysis of the note itself shows

that Appellant is personally liable.
Appellant's unqualified signature.

It bears the
U.C.A., §70-3-403,

(1953), establishes that where an authorized representative
of a corporation signs an instrument without indicating
he is signing in a representative capacity, he is personally
bound on the instrument.

The weight of case law and the
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underlying policy of negotiable instruments demand that
this statute be strictly construed against Appellant.
Also, the plural wording of the note requires a finding
that Appellant is obligated on the note along with the
defendant corporation.
Parol evidence admitted below supports the
lower Court's judgment that Appellant is liable.

The

evidence shows no agreement to the contrary between the
parties and shows that Plaintiff believed Appellant would
be personally liable.

Appellant's conduct in making cash

payments on the note out of his personal funds and in
accepting personal receipts back for these payments supports
a finding of Appellant's personal liability.
The documentary evidence presented below
also supports the lower Court's ruling.

It indicates

that Appellant knew how to sign the note in a representative
capacity if he wanted to.

Appellant's argument that the

documents should be construed together is erroneous, due
to the differing nature of the documents.
Testimony below demonstrates the unequal bargaining
position of the parties and Appellant's responsibility
for preparing the documents in issue.

Any ambiguity in

those documents should be resolved against Appellant.
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Appellant cites several cases in support of
his claim that he is not personally liable on the
note.

All these cases can be distinguished from the

instant case.

None of them requires the reversal of the

Court below.
The Appellant claims that Plaintiff should not
recover on the note because he already recovered his
interest in the mobile home by bidding on his judgment
at the sheriff's sale.

Appellant is entitled only to

$1,000.00 credit toward his debts for the amount bid at
the sale.

He has not demonstrated that $1,000.00 was

an unreasonable amount to bid at the sale, and in the
absence of unreasonableness the Court should not consider
whether Plaintiff ultimately made a good bargain on the
mobile home.

The Court should treat the auction as

though a stranger bid $1,000.00 on the collateral.

Moreover,

Plaintiff has not yet been put in as good a position as
he would have been in had Appellant not defaulted on
the note.

The chattel morteage in issue permits

recovery of any dificiency on the note after the mortgage
is foreclosed.
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The decision of the Court below that App2l1ant
is personally liable to Plaintiff for the deficiency
on the note should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

~.::?SR~D"'-'9""-.-.........,,~..-,,
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to C. Glenn
Robertson, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Larry
Sorenson, 9455 Peruvian Drive, Sandy, Utah 84070,
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Serivice
the ::?'7~day of February, 1980.

~

&~

,c::'

BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

